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Because software is fungible, has low marginal replication costs, and requires relatively high levels 
of initial investment to develop, understanding how IT-producing firms protect and leverage value 
from their research and development (R&D) investments is important. We examine how the 
positioning of IT-producing firms within their networks of strategic alliances moderates profits from 
R&D investments. We posit that alliances with IT-consuming firms generate relation-specific rents 
that, in turn, protect the value of R&D investments by making software innovations difficult for 
rivals to appropriate. Among IT-producing firms, we make a distinction between software consulting 
and services firms and software package-product firms. Our analyses of 464 IT-producing firms for 
the 14-year period 1996-2009 suggest that IT-producing firms’ returns on R&D investments increase 
with alliance ties to IT-consuming firms. We also find that alliances with IT-consuming firms have 
a more beneficial effect on R&D investment returns for software consulting and services firms than 
for software package-product firms. Our findings yield nuanced insights into how IT-producing firms 
should position themselves within a network of alliances with IT-consuming firms. We discuss 
implications for research and practice. 
Keywords: Information Technology Firms, Software, Alliances, Innovation, Network, Returns on 
Research & Development, R&D Investments 
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1 Introduction 
Firms that produce information technology often 
struggle to profit from their innovations, particularly 
considering the risks and benefits of collaborating with 
other firms. As larger segments of economic goods 
become tradable in digital form, IT-producing firms 
face even greater challenges in protecting and 
leveraging value from their research and development 
(R&D) investments. On the one hand, innovation in IT 
industries occurs in a distributed manner through 
multifirm collaborations (Yoo et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, value appropriation hazards in IT 
industries are relatively high, causing unintended 
resource spillovers between alliance partners (Han et 
al., 2012; Lavie, 2007). This situation creates a unique 
challenge for firms in IT industries: they need to 
collaborate with other IT-producing and IT-consuming 
firms in order to co-create value, and, at the same time, 
such collaborations expose them to a variety of risks.  
Among IT artifacts, software generates considerable 
variation in the value that firms derive from their 
Alliance Positioning and Returns to R&D   
 
384 
investments in R&D. Software requires very high and 
fixed initial investments but has low marginal 
replication costs. In addition, software is fungible and 
modular, with different modules often developed 
through combining internal R&D with external sources 
of knowledge from partner or customer collaborations. 
Software development is a major part of IT production 
and requires leveraging complementary resources 
through interfirm alliances. Because software enables 
and integrates business processes that run through 
almost every industry, IT production involves not only 
the development of hardware or software products in 
isolation but also the integration and servicing of 
software and its accompanying processes in many 
aspects of business and society (Nagle, 2018; Pan, 
Huang, & Gopal, 2019; Saunders & Brynjolfsson, 
2016).  
Although alliances have benefits and hazards, their 
overall effect on the value that IT-producing firms 
derive from their R&D investments is not well 
understood. Protecting the intellectual property (IP) of 
digital innovations such as software has proved 
challenging, and whether alliance benefits outweigh 
the risks of opportunistic partners is unclear in this 
industry context. Software patents have historically 
been controversial, uncertain, and unreliable in the 
degree of protection they provide (Bessen & Hunt, 
2007; Hurley, 2014). For example, some firms  
developed pioneering innovations for voice-
recognition technologies but were unable to protect 
and sustain value from their R&D investments; 
competitors  acquired related patents, replicated the 
underlying technology, claimed the IP rights through 
litigation, or used superior marketing resources to take 
control of the end market (Duhigg & Lohr, 2012).  
One way that IT-producing firms protect and sustain 
value from their R&D investments is through interfirm 
partnerships. For example, Apple leans heavily on 
complementary resources from its alliance partners in 
order to maximize the value of its own R&D efforts. 
Accordingly, the company earned $267 billion in annual 
revenue in 2019 while spending only 7.9% of its revenue 
on R&D. Even in areas such as artificial intelligence 
(AI), in which Apple has traditionally followed a more 
conservative partnership strategy, the company has 
started collaborating with its competitors to enhance its 
gains from R&D investments (Tilley, 2017). By 
contrast, Google earned $161.19 billion in annual 
revenue in 2019 and spent as much as 16% of its revenue 
on R&D. Among other firms, Infosys spent a 
significantly lower portion of its annual assets on R&D 
and  formed more partnerships for every dollar spent on 
R&D in comparison to IBM (see Figure 1).
 
 
Comparison of annual R&D over assets (top left), number of alliances per millions of dollars spent on 
R&D (top right), annual net income returns over R&D (bottom left), and annual net income returns 
over assets (ROA) (bottom right) for two software consulting-services firms: IBM and Infosys. While 
IBM has a higher R&D intensity compared to that of Infosys, Infosys has a more active alliancing 
strategy, accompanied by higher returns on R&D and returns on assets. (Data sources: Compustat and 
SDC Platinum) 
Figure 1: IBM vs. Infosys Example 
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Comparing Infosys to IBM further reveals that Infosys  
generated higher rates of net income over assets and  
created more income from each dollar spent on R&D. 
Whether the examples of Apple and Infosys 
correspond with a more general pattern such that 
alliances enable firms to leverage value from their 
R&D investments is an important and understudied 
empirical question. 
Against this backdrop, we examine how alliances 
made by IT-producing firms (i.e., those producing 
software, hardware, networking, and other IT services) 
moderate their returns on R&D investments.1 We draw 
upon and explain how the relational view of the firm 
described by Dyer and Singh (1998) offers some 
insight into when alliances provide beneficial 
mechanisms for deriving value from R&D 
investments, especially in light of the challenges 
involved in protecting digital innovations, which 
require high and risky levels of initial investment and 
can be subsequently replicated by opportunistic 
partners with only a marginal investment. The 
relational view bridges the resource-based view (RBV) 
and transaction cost economics (TCE) to describe how 
alliances create sustainable value in ways that are not 
easily appropriated by potential competitors or rival 
partners, in particular through the relation-specificity 
of alliance activities.  
To probe the role of these mechanisms, we consider 
alliances between IT-producing firms and IT-
consuming firms (i.e., firms in all other industries 
except IT) and distinguish software consulting and 
services firms from software package-product firms. 
We consider a focal IT-producing firm’s alliance 
positioning among IT-consuming firms, and  posit that 
alliances with IT-consuming firms generate relation-
specific rents. Since such investments do not transfer 
readily beyond the context of the relationship, they 
also leverage firm-specific and industry-specific 
processes that are difficult for competitors to replicate. 
In turn, these alliances protect the value of R&D 
investments for IT-producing firms by making their 
software innovations difficult for rivals to appropriate.  
We use a panel of 464 firms in IT-producing industries, 
spanning the 14-year period from 1996 to 2009. We 
construct a network of alliances in which at least one 
participant is a firm in an IT-producing industry and 
examine the returns to R&D as IT-producing firms 
form alliances with other IT-producing firms and also 
with IT-consuming firms. Our findings yield insights 
into how IT-producing firms should position 
themselves within an ecosystem through alliances with 
potential clients (i.e., IT-consuming firms) operating in 
industries characterized by heterogeneous IT intensity. 
 
1 Following prior literature, we adopt Gulati’s (1998, p. 293) 
definition of strategic alliances: “voluntary arrangements 
We find that alliances with IT-consuming firms have a 
more beneficial effect on R&D returns for software 
consulting and services firms than for software 
package-product firms. Finally, our findings suggest 
some implications for how IT-producing firms can 
protect their intellectual property (IP) and thereby 
generate positive economic returns on their R&D 
investments. 
Our theoretical contribution builds on the relational 
view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and creates a 
link between the information systems (IS) literatures 
on digital innovation and value co-creation in two 
specific ways. First, we contribute to the recent and 
growing literature on the economic value of IT 
investments and related strategic choices (Havakhor et 
al., 2019; Ravichandran et al., 2017; Steelman et al., 
2019; Yoo et al., 2010) and to the IS literature on 
innovation (Fichman et al., 2014; Kleis et al., 2012; 
Saldanha et al., 2017) by showing how IT-producing 
firms can profit from their investments in fungible 
digital innovation. By establishing a complementary 
relationship between IT-producing firms’ alliances 
with their customers and their R&D investments, our 
study posits that such alliances help IT-producing 
firms leverage value from and safeguard their 
investments in R&D. Second, our results contribute to 
the IS literature on coordination and architectural 
choices (Tafti et al., 2013; Tiwana, 2008) and to the IS 
literature on the co-creation of value from digital 
innovations (Foerderer et al., 2018; Han et al., 2012; 
Kim et al., 2016; Saldanha et al., 2017; Sarker et al., 
2012) by underscoring the importance of collaborative 
interfirm relationships for safeguarding IT-producing 
firms’ R&D investments.  
2 Background and Theoretical 
Framework 
2.1 Strategic Alliances in Software 
Industries 
Our review of extant research in the strategy literature 
suggests that alliance networks are often viewed as 
proxies for flows of knowledge (Ahuja, 2000a; 
Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Prior strategy literature 
highlights the importance of positioning within a 
broader network for firms to benefit from indirect as 
well as direct alliance relationships (Gulati, 1999; 
Stuart, 1998). In addition, this literature also focuses 
on how firms can mitigate the risks of knowledge 
appropriation by alliance partners, such as by limiting 
the scope of alliances (Oxley, 1999; Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004). IS scholars have contributed to the 
literature by investigating the link between strategic 
between firms involving the exchange, sharing, or co-
development of products, technologies, or services.” 
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alliances and information systems from different 
perspectives (see Table A1). This body of research 
explores IT strategic alliances from transaction cost 
and resource-based perspectives (Chi et al., 2010; 
Lavie, 2007), the design and architecture of shared IT 
resources (Tafti et al., 2013; Tiwana, 2008), the role of 
IT in sharing knowledge between alliance partners 
(Liu & Ravichandran, 2015; Ravichandran & Giura, 
2019), and the mechanisms that drive the co-creation 
of value in IT alliances (Han et al., 2012; Sarker et al., 
2012). In the current study, we focus on alliance 
positioning of IT-producing firms, defined as firms 
that provide software, hardware, networking, and other 
IT services (Nagle, 2018; Pan et al., 2019; Saunders & 
Brynjolfsson, 2016).  
The role of IT-related knowledge resources in creating 
relational rents in such alliances requires more 
attention for two specific reasons. First, software 
products are inherently networked products, developed 
and offered over a network of collaborating firms (Lee 
et al., 2010). Firms use alliances to implement different 
strategies to position themselves in networks of 
potential investors, clients, and rivals (Ahuja, 2000b). 
Positioning strategies can range from a broader 
strategy that fosters many alliance partnerships to a 
focused strategy that cultivates deeper collaborative 
relationships with fewer alliance partners. Prior 
research has considered the depth of collaborative 
activity in alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Tafti et al., 2013; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 
2002).  
An implication of the relational view of the firm is that 
IT-producing firms’ returns to R&D increase with the 
depth of collaborative activities. Tafti et al. (2013) 
define collaborative alliances as those that involve: (1) 
sharing firm-specific and tacit knowledge, (2) 
recombining products, services, and processes across 
organizational boundaries, or (3) heavy coupling of 
interorganizational processes. These collaborative 
alliances are distinguished from arm’s-length 
alliances, in which firms might share information or 
license rights to a product in activities that are loosely 
coupled, rather than in joint development, integration, 
or recombination of capabilities across industry 
boundaries. The literature shows that collaboration in 
joint research and development generally requires 
greater human co-specialization, process specificity, 
informal governance, and formation of trust—key 
elements of relational rents as described in Dyer and 
Singh (1998).  
Building on RBV and TCE, the relational view 
suggests that some information assets may not 
necessarily be specific to a firm; rather, they are 
specific to a relationship or network of relationships 
that ties multiple firms together (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
By definition, resources are relation-specific when 
they are more valuable within a firm’s network of 
interfirm relationships than they would be in the 
absence of such relationships. 
Second, although almost every innovation in IT 
involves the combined efforts of multiple firms, there 
are few mechanisms for IP protection. Contractual 
mechanisms are limited in their ability to quantify or 
delineate resources shared through IT alliances, and 
this creates higher levels of ambiguities for the 
exchange of resources in IT alliances, compared to 
other types of alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Saldanha et al., 2013). The 
knowledge shared through IT alliances—domain 
knowledge, design specifics, or the knowledge of 
developing or operationalizing a certain technology, 
for instance—is tacit and embodied in participating 
social structures, and thus not codifiable for structured 
transactions (Gans et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2018; 
Niculescu et al., 2018).  
Three theories provide useful insights to understand 
how IT-producing firms can effectively generate value 
in alliances while safeguarding their intellectual assets: 
TCE, RBV, and the relational view of the firm, which 
bridges the two former perspectives. TCE describes the 
conditions under which firms are more likely to benefit 
from close interfirm collaboration and those under 
which firms should maintain interfirm relationships at 
arm’s length (Parkhe, 1993). RBV holds that firms can 
sustain their competitive advantages by accumulating 
assets that are “rare, valuable, non-substitutable, and 
difficult to imitate” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 660). 
Sampler (1998) describes how digital assets, such as 
software, can be knowledge-specific to some firms. In 
turn, such information assets would be costly to 
transfer and, thus, difficult for competitors to steal. A 
firm’s knowledge base can make it uniquely capable of 
generating value from an information asset, 
particularly when the knowledge base itself is 
embedded in a specific business context or when the 
knowledge is tacit, unstructured, and embedded in a 
firm’s idiosyncratic organizational culture and routines 
(Sampler, 1998).  
We adopt a relational view of the firm perspective 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) and argue that relation-specific 
resources in collaborative alliances enable IT-
producing firms to derive greater value from their 
R&D investments, particularly when IP protection 
mechanisms are not strong. Among IT-producing 
firms, we make a distinction between software 
“consulting-services” firms, which are focused on 
building firm-specific and industry-specific 
knowledge, and software “package-product” firms that 
develop broad applications that work across multiple 
contexts. From a relational view of the firm, we expect 
resources shared through alliances between software 
consulting-services firms and their partners to be more 
specific to the scope of their partnerships. 
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2.2 Alliances with IT-Consuming Firms  
Although prior research has typically described 
positioning for access to resources as a critical 
component of competitive strategy, the research also 
suggests that the nexus of such resources is not the firm 
itself but the industry ecosystem in which the firm 
operates and the concentration of fungible knowledge 
that resides within the industry (Adner & Kapoor, 
2010; Powell et al., 1996). In this context, partnerships 
between firms that produce IT and firms that consume 
IT are becoming increasingly important in creating 
new products and services in the contemporary 
economy. For example, Microsoft partnered with 
many health care organizations to offer free internet-
based personal health records in an initiative called 
HealthVault. Microsoft has also partnered with Ford to 
provide the software layer to manage the operation and 
charging of electric vehicles (Microsoft, 2010), 
extending existing partnerships for providing vehicle 
entertainment and communication systems. Such 
partnerships or alliances, at the interface between IT-
producing and IT-consuming firms, involve the joint 
development or licensing of digital products or 
services, as well as the integration of knowledge 
among alliance partners (Tiwana, 2008). 
Consider the example of the alliance between 
Microsoft and Ford (Microsoft, 2010). This alliance 
has its origins in Microsoft’s first alliance in 1998 with 
Clarion Corporation, a provider of automotive 
entertainment electronics, to develop the “AutoPC,” an 
in-car entertainment and information platform built on 
Windows CE (Microsoft, 1998). This initiative led to 
the “SYNC” service in Ford vehicles from 2007, which 
was intended to allow drivers to control their mobile 
phones or media players with the interface provided by 
the SYNC platform. Microsoft gained access to Ford’s 
customers by gaining domain expertise from Clarion 
Corporation. Microsoft later developed similar 
services for Kia, Nissan, and Fiat (Archambault, 
2013).  
This example demonstrates how the domain-specific 
knowledge derived from collaborating with an IT-
consuming firm enables an IT-producing firm to 
develop new domain-relevant products and services. 
Prior research suggests that firms can foster innovation 
through collaboration with potential clients (Saldanha 
et al., 2017). Moreover, these partnerships enable the 
joint development of products and services, extending 
the nexus of a firm’s capabilities beyond its boundaries 
(Afuah, 2000) and ultimately leading to cross-industry 
spillovers and the generation of new knowledge and 
resources (Lavie, 2007). 
 
2  IT-consuming firms may be in such industries as 
commercial banking, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, 
We next present some testable implications of the 
relational view to consider how alliances with IT-
consuming firms can enhance returns on R&D 
investments for IT-producing firms. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Alliances Among IT-Producing and 
IT-Consuming Firms 
Compared to alliances between two IT-producing 
firms, alliances between IT-producing and IT-
consuming firms are subject to a qualitatively different 
form of transaction hazard (Hagedoorn, 1993). IT-
consuming firms produce something other than IT 
hardware or software as their primary goods or 
services, though they may rely heavily on IT in many 
of their functional areas and production processes.2 IT-
consuming partners may be clients to focal IT-
producing firms at the same time that they build their 
own IT capabilities, such as custom software 
applications (Qu et al., 2010). While IT-consuming 
partner firms do not necessarily pose a direct 
competitive threat, they may act opportunistically in 
appropriating the IP from their alliance partners in the 
software industry (Lavie, 2006). Some IT-consuming 
firms may also have high levels of absorptive capacity 
to learn and make use of technical knowledge and, in 
turn, develop industry-specific or domain-specific 
solutions (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). For focal IT-
producing firms, their alliance partners’ high levels of 
industry-specific knowledge can put them in a 
vulnerable position; alliance partners can develop 
competing products or services for firms within their 
own industries, market to the clients of the focal IT-
producing firms, and undermine their alliance 
partners’ profits (Mowery et al., 1996). IT-consuming 
firms may also have alternative alliance partners that 
are competitors to a focal IT-producing firm, resulting 
in an indirect alliance-network link between the focal 
IT-producing firm and its competitors, which could be 
detrimental to the focal firm.  
Despite the potential hazards, an IT-producing firm 
might benefit from alliances with IT-consuming firms. 
First, the process of co-invention could yield benefits 
for both IT-producing and IT-consuming firms’ 
alliance partners. The process of co-invention is 
integral to the structure of the software industry 
(Bresnaham & Greenstein, 1997). New products are 
developed and introduced to IT-consuming firms 
through a collaborative process in which IT-
consuming firms also reinvent and reorganize their 
own processes. For example, Oracle collaborated with 
major banks to build core banking systems (Palmer, 
manufacturing, entertainment, hospitality, and transportation 
and logistics, to name a few among many other industries.  
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2013). Accenture and SAP jointly worked with 
petroleum and natural gas companies to develop 
hydrocarbon production accounting systems for 
managing gas and oil production data (Digital Energy 
Journal, 2014). In the process of such co-invention, IT-
producing firms gain valuable firm-specific 
knowledge. The absorbed knowledge is firm-specific 
because it is only created through the relationship 
between the IT-producing firm and its specific IT-
consuming customers. Meanwhile, the appropriated 
knowledge is valuable because it results from complex 
social interactions between groups of specialists from 
the IT-producing firm and its IT-consuming partners 
and is not easily imitable by its rivals. Because 
specialized expertise is hard for rivals to appropriate, 
IT-producing firms are better able to sustain and derive 
value from their R&D investments.  
Another potential benefit from an IT-producing firm’s 
alliances with IT-consuming firms involves the 
complexity of integration and depth of firm-specific 
knowledge tied to value chain activities that can help 
protect IP related to those activities (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). For example, Dyer and Hatch (2006, p. 701) 
describe how specialized interorganizational routines 
and policies between automakers and suppliers acted 
as “barriers to knowledge transfer”, preventing 
valuable capabilities from being redeployed to 
competitors or their networks. Hence, the co-invention 
process can foster relation-specific investments. 
Alliances with IT-consuming partners provide a way 
of safeguarding and deriving value from R&D 
investments. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: IT-producing firms’ returns to R&D investments 
increase as they form more alliances with other 
IT-consuming firms. 
2.3.2 The Role of Relation-Specificity: 
Distinguishing among Alliances of 
Software Package-Product versus 
Software Consulting-Services Firms 
We distinguish between two broad subclasses of firms 
in the software industry. The first category is software 
package-product firms, which produce encrypted 
software products and tend to rely on strong IP 
protections (e.g., patents, encryption, copyrights, etc.) 
because their software products are general purpose 
commodities used broadly in many industry contexts. 
Firms such as Microsoft exemplify this business 
model. The second category is software consulting-
services firms, which develop software to enable 
industry-specific and firm-specific processes. Firms 
such as Accenture, Infosys, and Wipro exemplify this 
model as they focus on building highly specialized 
software for clients and, in turn, develop a depth of 
expertise in specific industries and firm processes.  
Two major features distinguish software consulting-
services firms from software package-product firms. 
First, the former firms focus on building firm-specific 
and industry-specific knowledge rather than broad 
applications that work across multiple contexts (Kim, 
Mithas, Whitaker, & Roy, 2014; Whitaker, Mithas, & 
Liu, 2019).  
Second, consulting-services firms do not have strong 
encryption mechanisms built into their product 
delivery mechanisms. In addition, they deliver services 
according to specifications and contractual terms 
specified by their clients, and clients sometimes 
assume IP rights over the specific products these firms 
build. At the same time, consulting-services firms 
develop their own IP around specialized knowledge of 
vertical industries and firm-specific processes through 
the idiosyncratic knowledge gained from collaboration 
with IT-consuming firms. For example, Accenture 
developed an Air Cargo reservations software system 
through close collaboration with clients in the logistics 
and transportation industries (Logistics Business 
Review, 2014). Other software consulting-services 
firms focus on the idiosyncratic needs of their IT-
consuming alliance partners, such as in CSC’s long-
term partnership with Zurich Insurance (Savvas, 2014) 
through which CSC provides specialized desktop 
software services. As consulting-services firms focus 
on more industry-specific and firm-specific 
collaboration in developing specialized software 
services, the idiosyncratic requirements of their IT-
consuming partners serve to protect and sustain the 
value of their R&D investments.  
Accordingly, we posit that compared to software 
package-product firms, software consulting-services 
firms depend more heavily on informal sources of IP 
protection, which in the alliance context means making 
relation-specific investments through close 
collaboration with IT-consuming firms. Thus, we 
hypothesize:  
H2: Among IT-producing firms, alliances with IT-
consuming firms have a more beneficial effect on 
R&D returns for software consulting-services 
firms than for software package-product firms. 
3 Method 
We model a network of IT-producing firms and their 
alliance partners in which nodes represent firms and 
undirected edges represent alliance relationships. This 
alliance network includes collaborative development 
projects, outsourcing and licensing contracts, joint 
ventures, and standards-based coalitions, among other 
cooperative initiatives that link IT-producing and IT-
consuming firms. We initially obtained 16,432 alliance 
announcements from the SDC Platinum database (a 
product of Thomson-Reuters Corporation), resulting in 
18,184 alliance pairs. Some alliance announcements 
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include more than two firms; hence, such alliances 
result in more than one pair of linked firms.  
The alliance announcements span the years 1996-2009 
for the main analysis and 1991-2016 for a robustness 
test, and each alliance has at least one participant in IT-
producing industries.3 Consistent with similar usage in 
the existing literature (Nagle, 2018; Pan et al., 2019; 
Saunders & Brynjolfsson, 2016), our definition of IT-
producing firms includes firms that provide software, 
hardware, networking, and other IT services. The focal 
firms in our study comprise a narrower sample of 
software consulting-services (NAICS codes 5415 and 
518) and software package-product (NAICS codes 
5112) firms.4  
Our final sample comprises a total of 3,535 linked pairs 
forming a bipartite network that connects firms in the 
narrower sample (of software consulting-services and 
package-product firms) with firms in IT-consuming 
industries. In Section 4.3.3, we report results for firms 
in all IT-producing industries for an extended time 
period as a robustness check. 
Following prior literature, we assume alliance 
formation dates to be the date of the alliance 
announcement (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Since firms 
rarely announce the termination of an alliance, we set 
the lifetime of alliances to be three years, a span 
consistently used in previous studies with the same 
data source (Lavie, 2007); this approximation is 
conventional in alliance studies using the SDC 
Platinum database (e.g., Schilling & Phelps, 2007). For 
each firm in each year, we obtained measures 
pertaining to a firm’s positioning within the network of 
IT-producing and IT-consuming firms. We calculated 
aggregate measures of network metrics, along with 
other quantitative firm metrics, across all IT-
consuming partners of each IT-producing firm (the 
focal firms serving as the units of analysis). We then 
merged the alliance network data with the Compustat 
Industrial annual database for each combination of 
focal IT-producing firm and year.  
The final data set is an unbalanced panel of firms in IT-
producing industries, including industry-level IT 
investment figures from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), IT-producing firms’ package and 
consulting sales from Compustat Segments, and firm 
performance metrics and controls from Compustat. We 
merged this data set with the set of assigned US patents 
available on the website of the NBER patent data 
project. 5  The final sample includes 464 firms and 
1,311 firm-year observations. Table 1 presents a 
summary of variables. Table 2 shows summary 
statistics for IT-producing firms in the sample and 
correlations. 
To operationalize the two hypothesized types of 
relationships, we develop two network measures: 
OutNet (alliances with IT-consuming firms) 6  and 
IndirectNet (indirect alliance links with IT-producing 
firms through alliances with common IT-consuming 
partners). The OutNet measure captures cross-industry 
alliances with IT-consuming partners. For each IT-
producing firm, this is the number of alliances with IT-
consuming firms. The IndirectNet measure captures 
indirect alliance links with IT-producing firms through 
alliances with common IT-consuming partners. For 
each IT-producing firm, this is the average number of 
its IT-consuming partners’ alliances with other firms 
in IT-producing industries. Log values are used in all 
regressions. We also develop an InNet measure (direct 
alliances with other IT-producing firms) to control for 
alliances with other IT-producing firms.  
Figure 2 illustrates the alliance network connecting IT 
producers and IT consumers in the year 2007, one of 
the years of our 14-year panel data set. We select and 
highlight a small subset of the overall network showing 
First Data Corp (a data services and payment 
processing provider) at the center of its subnetwork of 
alliances with firms in the financial industry. The 
alliance between First Data Corp (an IT-producing 
firm) and JPMorgan Chase (an IT-consuming firm) is 
thus counted as an OutNet alliance for First Data. 
Meanwhile, the indirect connection between First Data 
and Trading Technologies Intl Inc. through their 
common alliance with JPMorgan Chase is counted as 
an IndirectNet alliance.  
 
3  Broader IT-producing industries include NAICS codes 
511-Information and Software Publishers; 517-
Telecommunications; 519-Information Services; 334-
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing; 518-Data 
Processing, Hosting, and Related Services; 333-
Semiconductor Manufacturing; 335-Electrical Equipment, 
Appliance, and Component Manufacturing; and 423- 
Computer and Computer Peripheral Equipment and Software 
Merchant Wholesalers. Some firms with NAICS codes 561- 
Administrative and Support Services; 541-Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical Services; and 443-Elecronics and 
Appliances Stores also fit this classification to the extent that 
they provide software products or information systems 
consulting services.  
4  We identify software consulting-services firms as those 
with the following NAICS classifications: 5415-Computer 
Systems Design and Related Services and 518-Data 
Processing, Hosting, and Related Services. 
5 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent data 
project: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ 
6 We also constructed an alternative measure of OutNet by 
multiplying firms’ number of alliances with IT-producing 
firms by the R&D intensity of those IT-producing partners. 
The results gained after using this alternative measure were 
consistent with our main results.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Key variables Definition Source 
Profits Total net operating income, in millions of dollars.  Compustat 
R&D investments 
(RD)  
Research and development, in millions of dollars. In the regression models, we 
use the logarithm of R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory 





Cross-industry alliances with IT-consuming partners. For each IT-producing 
firm, this is the number of alliances with IT-consuming firms. Log values are 




Binary indicator variable classifying the focal firm as a software consulting-
services firm according to NAICS classifications 5415-Computer Systems 
Design and Related Services or 518- Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services. 
Compustat 
Indirect alliance links 
with IT-Producing 
Firms (IndirectNet) 
Indirect alliance links with IT-producing firms through alliances with common 
IT-consuming partners. For each IT-producing firm, this is the average number 
of alliances held by its IT-consuming partners with other firms in the IT-
producing industries. Log values are used in all regressions. 
SDC Platinum  
Alliances with other 
IT-producing firms 
(InNet) 
Direct alliances with other IT producers. Log values are used in all regressions. SDC Platinum  
Consultancy sales 
(Consult Sales) 
Ratio of a firm’s sales in NAICS classifications 5415-Computer Systems 
Design and Related Services and 518-Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 




sales (Package Sales) 
Ratio of a firm’s sales in NAICS classification 5112-Software Publishers to 
their total sales. 
Compustat 
Segments 
Software patents Number of assigned US patents registered under the 7XX technology class in 
one year.  
NBER 
Patents  Number of assigned US patents in the preceding five years, expressed in logs.  NBER 
Betweenness centrality Betweenness centrality for node i is calculated as the sum of the ratio of the 
total number of shortest paths between every two nodes j and k in the network 
that pass through node i, 𝜎𝑗𝑘(i), over the total number of shortest paths between 
every two nodes j and k, 𝜎𝑗𝑘 (Freeman, 1978).  
SDC Platinum 
Constraint The constraint between two nodes i and j is measured as the sum of the 
intensity of the direct relationship between those two nodes, 𝑝𝑖𝑗, as well as the 
intensity of every indirect path between those two nodes that goes at least 
through node q (Burt, 2009). 
SDC Platinum 
Degree centrality Number of firms each firm is connected to.  SDC Platinum 
JVs/total alliances Ratio of a firm’s joint ventures over their total number of alliances. SDC Platinum 
R&D/total alliances Ratio of a firm’s R&D alliances over their total number of alliances.  SDC Platinum 
Tie multiplicity Ratio of a firm’s total alliance activities over their total number of alliances.  SDC Platinum 
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Table 2. Correlations and Summary Statistics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 (1) Profits 1.000        
 (2) Tobin’s q -0.014 1.000       
 (3) Alliances with IT-
Consuming Firms (OutNet) 
0.346* 0.058 1.000      
 (4) Alliances with IT-Producing 
Firms (InNet) 
0.431* 0.051 0.268* 1.000     
 (5) Indirect Alliances with IT- 
Producing Firms (IndirectNet) 
0.083* 0.047 0.629* 0.019 1.000    
 (6) Consultancy Firm (Consult) 0.086* 0.007 -0.138* -0.020 -0.117* 1.000   
 (7) R&D Stock 0.481* -0.120* 0.348* 0.389* 0.160* -0.048 1.000  
 (8) Patents 0.429* -0.049 0.306* 0.338* 0.165* 0.023 0.577* 1.000 
 (9) ITIndPartners 0.038 0.039 0.607* -0.112* 0.567* -0.138* 0.099* 0.107* 
 (10) Total Capital 0.513* -0.072 0.302* 0.422* 0.116* 0.226* 0.776* 0.462* 
 (11) Market Share 0.450* -0.132* 0.272* 0.411* 0.101* 0.115* 0.766* 0.450* 
 (12) HHI 0.117* -0.030 -0.197* 0.003 -0.181* 0.753* 0.047 0.005 
 (13) RDPartners 0.067 0.001 0.246* -0.025 0.188* -0.044 -0.001 0.030 
 (14) Collab 0.490* 0.061 0.527* 0.545* 0.221* -0.036 0.324* 0.408* 
 (15) Arm’s-Length 0.347* 0.060 0.497* 0.406* 0.191* -0.051 0.205* 0.293* 
 Obs 1311 1218 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
 Mean 463.83 3.75 3.36 2.98 3.17 0.278 700.38 31.24 
 Std Dev 2373.3 8.90 15.52 7.98 8.74 0.448 3336.5 282.06 
 Min -269.8 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
 Max 25877 189.8 248.0 115.0 74.0 1 38571 3652.0 
Variables (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
 (9) ITIndPartners 1.000        
 (10) Total Capital 0.030 1.000       
 (11) Market Share 0.019 0.878* 1.000      
 (12) HHI -0.196* 0.257* 0.140* 1.000     
 (13) RDPartners 0.271* 0.012 0.001 -0.072* 1.000    
 (14) Collab 0.142* 0.317* 0.309* -0.066 0.077* 1.000   
 (15) Arm’s-Length 0.156* 0.192* 0.206* -0.104* 0.116* 0.675* 1.000  
 Obs 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311  
 Mean 25.26 406.99 0.01 0.06 1.05 2.687 1.416  
 Std Dev 29.06 2520.6 0.03 0.03 3.41 7.105 3.551  
 Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0  
 Max 87.7 39596 0.3 0.2 59.9 125 52  
 





IT-producing companies (blue nodes), such as First Data Corp, have direct ties to other IT-producing 
companies and IT-consuming firms (red nodes). Further, IT-producing firms have indirect ties to other 
IT-producing firms through common partners (i.e., the triad between First Data Corp, JP Morgan 
Chase, and Trading Technologies in the close-up in the bubble on the right).  
Note: Largest connected component of firms with at least one degree of connection is presented with 
node size scaled by log(Sales). In the close-up of First Data’s subnetwork on the right, node-size 
scaling range is reduced. 
Figure 2: Year 2007 Snapshot of Alliance Network and Close-Up View of Selected Network Segment 
Since both Trading Technologies International and Eze 
Castle Integration Inc. are IT-producing firms, their 
direct connection counts as an InNet alliance. We are 
interested in the moderating influence of OutNet on 
R&D investment returns. We also control for 
IndirectNet, indirect connections formed through an 
IT-consuming partner firms’ alternative alliances with 
other IT-producing firms; Arm’s-Length, the number 
of arm’s-length alliance activities; and the interactions 
of these variables with R&D.  
We construct a set of network and alliance-based 
measures using a network of strategic alliances: 
network diversity, betweenness centrality, degree 
centrality, access to structural holes, joint ventures to 
total, R&D to total, and tie multiplicity. Network 
diversity is measured as the Shannon entropy of the 
weights of its incident edges (Eagle et al., 2010). 
Betweenness centrality represents the portion of 
shortest paths that traverse a node (Freeman, 1978). 
The constraint measure represents the density of 
connections among a node’s neighbors, and therefore 
is the inverse of access to structural holes (Burt, 2004). 
Joint ventures to total is constructed as the ratio of the 
number of joint ventures over the total number of firm 
alliances. R&D to total is constructed as the ratio of the 
number of R&D alliances over the total number of firm 
alliances. Tie multiplicity is constructed as the total 
number of alliance activities reported for all firm 
alliances over its total number of alliances. Including 
these structural measures controls for the potential 
confounding effects of a firm’s network structure on 
both the existence and strength of a firm’s ties with IT 
consumers and its R&D stock—and helps to isolate the 
hypothesized effects. At the same time, these measures 
mitigate potential concerns regarding the 
interdependencies between our main variables and 
network-related time-variant unobservable factors.  
For our empirical analyses, we consider the following 
base model as a starting point: 
Profits = β1 log(OutNet) X log(RD) + β2 
log(OutNet) X log(RD) X Consult  + XcBc 
+ ∑β tYeart + ∑β iIndustryi +ui + εi, t   (1) 
To test the first hypothesis, we consider the coefficient 
β1 of the interaction between log(RD) and log(OutNet). 
To test the second hypothesis, we consider the 
coefficient β2 of the three-way interaction between the 
terms Consult (consulting-services firms), log(RD), 
and log(OutNet). Our estimation model includes all of 
the main effects and two-way interactions implied by 
the three-way interaction model, which we subsume in 
the matrix Xc along with all other control variables to 
display Equation (1) succinctly. We control for Patents 
(patents awarded over the preceding five years) and the 
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full model of two-way and three-way interactions 
involving Patents, R&D, and each of the three types of 
alliances.  
As an alternative to the dichotomous classification 
between software consulting-services firms and 
software package-product firms and to allow for a 
continuous spectrum of firms’ activities between these 
two types, we use the sales that firms report in both 
market segments. Using the Compustat Segments 
database, we construct the alternative measures 
Consultancy Sales and Package Sales, measured 
respectively as the ratios of firms’ revenue from 
consultancy and packaged software sales over their 
total sales.  
We use fixed-effect panel regression estimates to test 
our hypotheses. This method controls for all 
unobserved firm characteristics that change little over 
time.7 We also use indicator variables for each year in 
the sample (excluding one reference year) in addition 
to accounting for the fixed effect of each firm; thus, we 
utilize a two-way fixed-effect panel model based on 
each firm-year combination. To facilitate 
interpretation of regression results, we mean-center the 
values of variables used in interaction terms, including 
R&D, patents, and alliance network variables for all 
regression models. 
The profitability model is based on the basic model 
derived in Jaffe (1986), and we extend that empirical 
framework here.8 We measure Profits as total annual 
net operating income, in millions of dollars. R&D in 
the profits model is calculated as a stock value using 
the perpetual inventory method. The matrix Xc 
represents a matrix of control variable data including 
the controls mentioned above as well as the logarithm 
of capital, logarithm of market share, and Herfindahl 
Index (HHI), which is a measure of industry 
concentration. In addition, we control for IT intensity 
of partner industries (ITPartnerIndus) and R&D 
intensity of partner industries (RDPartnerIndus). We 
further examine models with log(Tobin’s q) as their 
dependent variable. In the Tobin’s q models, we use 
advertising intensity and number of employees—
commonly used controls for such models—in addition 
to the controls used in the profitability models. 
Table 3 shows our estimates for the fixed-effect panel 
regression testing the first hypothesis. As shown in 
Table 3, we test H1 using the estimate of coefficient β1 
of the interaction between OutNet and R&D.  
We test Hypothesis 2 (H2) in two ways. First, as shown 
in Model 1 of Table 4, we use coefficient β2 of the 
 
7 The average variance inflation factor (VIF) of time-varying 
terms in the model is 5.5, well below the threshold of concern 
for multicollinearity. Added variable plots indicate no visual 
evidence of influential outliers.  
three-way interaction term Consult X RD X OutNet in 
a regression test that includes all IT-producing firms, 
where Consult is a binary indicator for software 
consulting-services firms. In effect, this test compares 
the β1 coefficient of the interaction term RD X OutNet 
between the two subclasses of the software industry in 
a single combined sample of all IT-producing firms. 
Second, as presented in Table 4, we conduct panel 
regressions for the subsample of software consulting-
services firms in Model 2 and for the subsample of 
software package-product firms in Model 3. In this 
way, we further test H2 by comparing the coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term RD X OutNet across 
these two models. By using firm-level fixed effects in 
all panel regression models, we also account for 
variation in the fungibility of digital products and 
services among different industries. 
4 Results 
4.1 Main Results 
We find support for H1, which predicts that alliances 
with IT-consuming firms are associated with greater 
returns to IT-producing firms’ R&D investments, 
because the coefficient β1 of the interaction term RD X 
OutNet in Model 1 of Table 3 is positive and 
statistically significant (β1 = 131.3, and is statistically 
significant at a 1% level). Table 3 also shows the 
results of excluding different sets of control variables 
in Model 2 and Model 3. The consistency among the 
coefficient estimates for H1 in these three models 
shows that the results are not attributable to 
confounding influences from any group of control 
variables.  
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates of 
patenting interactions terms with OutNet (Patent X 
OutNet) and with InNet (Patent X InNet) in addition to 
the interactions between R&D stock and the same set 
of variables. The results show a positive moderating 
effect of R&D but a potentially hindering effect of 
patenting activities for firms involved in strategic 
alliances. Thus, these findings suggest that patenting 
activities, which are formal IP protection mechanisms, 
may not contribute much to annual firm profits in the 
context of strategic alliances. This is consistent with 
the theory underlying our hypotheses: tacit/relational 
mechanisms are more effective than formal protection 
mechanisms in safeguarding IP in the context of 
interfirm alliances.  
8 As a robustness step, we also estimate our hypothesized 
relationships using the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
which provides consistent results.  
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Table 3. Moderating Influence of Alliances on Effect of R&D on Firm Profits: Test of H1 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
Profits Profits Profits 
H1: RD X OutNet (Alliances with IT-consuming firms) 131.3*** 44.11*** 90.33*** 
 (22.42) (14.92) (17.31) 
RD X InNet (Alliances with IT-producers) 141.1***   
 (19.97)   
RD X IndirectNet (Indirect Links to IT-producers) -31.33   
 (20.21)   
Patent X OutNet -159.8***   
 (21.11)   
Patent X InNet -89.40***   
 (19.59)   
Patent X IndirectNet 87.01***   
 (20.90)   
IndirectNet -20.01 9.811  
 (34.91) (32.44)  
InNet 21.72 209.7***  
 (44.45) (40.18)  
Patent -170.9*** -60.42  
 (42.65) (45.57)  
ITPartnerIndus -0.000267 0.422  
 (1.004) (1.109)  
log(Capital) 50.60 82.81  
 (51.29) (56.38)  
log(Marketshare) 62.99 48.19  
 (57.47) (63.48)  
HHI -214.5 1,496  
 (1,552) (1,704)  
Collab -33.39*** -49.76***  
 (4.639) (4.875)  
Arm’s-Length -98.96*** -117.5***  
 (8.654) (9.154)  
RD 29.22 9.785 83.33 
 (49.50) (54.54) (58.16) 
RD X Patent 35.24*** -42.98*** -66.89*** 
 (10.80) (9.108) (6.422) 
OutNet 74.04 112.3* -167.9*** 
 (57.98) (60.76) (51.90) 
Constant 962.6* 773.9 156.4 
 (523.7) (577.4) (113.4) 
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,315 
Number of Unique Firms 464 464 467 
F stat 42.03*** 35.13*** 15.88*** 
R-squared 0.615 0.527 0.245 
Note: Fixed-effect panel regression. Dependent variables are annual profit. 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression, with standard errors in parentheses. 
The model includes indicator variables for each year, as well as firm-level fixed effects. The research and development (RD) 
variable is the logarithm of R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Logarithm values of InNet, OutNet, and 
IndirectNet are also used.  
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Table 4: Comparison of Software Consulting-Services Firms and Software Package-Product Firms in the 
Moderating Influence of Cross-Industry Alliances on R&D Returns: Test of H2 
VARIABLES 





H2: RD X Consult (Consultancy) X Alliances with IT-




H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet) 90.44*** 138.4*** 87.54*** 
(25.32) (26.87) (29.57) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-producers (IndirectNet)  137.6*** 96.74*** 129.4*** 
 (19.81) (22.01) (26.43) 
RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) -28.67 -41.84 -19.08 
 (20.02) (26.01) (24.64) 
Patent X OutNet -182.2*** -110.8*** -198.7*** 
 (21.55) (26.20) (28.13) 
Patent X InNet -88.48*** 86.96*** -142.5*** 
 (19.43) (22.20) (26.46) 
Patent X IndirectNet 85.46*** 75.44*** 77.36*** 
 (20.70) (24.75) (26.43) 
RD X Consult 128.5 83.29  
 (79.88) (52.42)  
Consult X OutNet -26.30 20.52  
 (83.41) (63.17)  
Consult -154.1   
 (664.4)   
RD X Patent 53.44*** -63.94*** 90.04*** 
 (11.52) (15.07) (15.68) 
OutNet 124.8*  147.3* 
 (65.93)  (77.22) 
IndirectNet -23.22 -33.60 -33.91 
 (34.60) (45.54) (42.74) 
InNet 23.43 -70.97 36.43 
 (44.08) (58.40) (54.20) 
RD -3.373  -45.61 
 (56.83)  (66.20) 
Patent -196.3*** 89.55 -244.1*** 
 (42.64) (60.30) (51.10) 
ITPartnerIndus -0.249 -1.095 -0.0793 
 (1.000) (1.447) (1.190) 
log(Capital) 50.33 78.94 19.27 
 (50.84) (75.69) (60.50) 
log(Marketshare) 63.70 -16.57 117.8* 
 (57.11) (83.84) (69.00) 
HHI 2,613 -5,763* 9,144** 
 (2,155) (3,431) (4,035) 
Collab -29.04*** 40.40*** -25.35*** 
 (4.712) (10.89) (5.423) 
Arm’s-Length -105.1*** -114.1*** -107.2*** 
 (8.803) (16.79) (10.11) 
Constant 875.3 1,413 1,125* 
 (548.4) (1,063) (603.7) 
Observations 1,311 365 946 
R-squared 0.625 0.831 0.621 
Number of Unique Firms 464 150 315 
F stat 38.59*** 29.15*** 32.89*** 
Note: Fixed-effect panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits.  
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. All models 
include indicator variables for each year and indicator variables for each NAICS industry at the three-digit level. The research and development 
(RD) variable is the logarithm of R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Logarithm values of InNet, OutNet, and 
IndirectNet are also used.  




This figure presents the marginal effects of OutNet for Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 4. For both 
samples of software package-product and software consulting-services firms, as firms invest more in 
their R&D, the predicted effect of their alliances with IT-consuming firms on their profits increases. 
However, except for firms with R&D stock lower than $10 billion, the estimated effect of OutNet is 
significantly higher for consulting-services firms compared to the estimated effect of OutNet for 
package-product firms. Both X and Y axes are in millions of dollars.  
Note: For better visualization, we have replaced the two logarithm-transferred and mean-centered 
variables of R&D and OutNet with their original values: R&D stock and number of alliances with IT-
consuming firms. 
Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Alliances with IT-Consuming Firms (OutNet) on Net Income in Millions of Dollars 
 
Table 4 presents the results of testing H2, which 
predicts that alliances with IT consumers are 
associated with a more beneficial effect on R&D 
returns for software consulting-services firms than for 
software package-product firms. A parsimonious and 
formal way of testing this comparison involves a 
regression test that includes all IT-producing firms, 
testing the three-way interaction term RD X Consult X 
Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet). This 
model also includes all of the implied two-way 
interactions (RD X OutNet, RD X Consult, and Consult 
X OutNet). As seen in Model 1 of Table 4, the estimate 
of the three-way interaction term RD X Consult X 
OutNet is positive and statistically significant (β2 = 
107.9, and is statistically significant at a 1% level) in 
support of H2. While software packaging (and the 
copyright protections associated with software 
packaging) and patenting may be seen as means of 
protecting IP, our results support the view that the tacit 
and relational mechanisms at work in collaborative 
relationships, such as in interfirm consulting practices, 
appear to be a more effective way to reap benefits from 
R&D investments through alliance partnerships. 
Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 4 provide further 
support for H2 as the estimated β1 (=138.4) in Model 2 
is statistically significant at a 1% level and is higher 
than it is in Model 3 (β1 = 87.54). 
Figure 3 presents the marginal effect on net income of 
IT-producing firms’ alliances with IT-consuming 
firms as an increasing function of their R&D stock, 
comparing this effect between the two samples of 
package-product and consulting-services firms. This 
figure is based on estimates from Model 2 and Model 
3 in Table 4 for the consulting-services and package-
product firms, respectively. To calculate the marginal 
effects of OutNet in Figure 3, we fix R&D stock at $1 
billion increments between our sample’s minimum and 
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maximum values. For each value of R&D stock in this 
range, we calculate and present the marginal effect of 
one more alliance with IT-consumers on the firm’s net 
income. This figure shows that for both software 
package-product and consulting-services firms, as 
firms invest more in their R&D the predicted 
profitability effect of their alliances with IT-
consuming firms increases. For example, a consulting-
services firm with $30 billion in R&D stock should be 
able to extract an extra $100 million to $200 million 
for each alliance with an IT-consuming firm. By 
contrast, a package-product firm with $30 billion in 
R&D stock would be able to extract no more than $40 
million for each alliance with an IT-consuming firm. 
Figure 3 shows that except for firms with R&D stock 
lower than $10 billion, the estimated effect of OutNet 
is significantly higher for consulting-services firms 
than for package-product firms.  
We further explored our models using alternative 
measures for our theoretical constructs. Table 5 
presents the results of using the alternative measures of 
Consultancy Sales and Package Sales instead of the 
binary measure of Consult. This table’s results show a 
positive and significant moderating influence of 
Consultancy Sales (in proportion to total sales) on the 
effect of the interaction between RD and OutNet (see 
the coefficient estimate for the three-way interaction 
RD X Consultancy Sales X OutNet) on firm profits. 
Although not directly hypothesized, the negative and 
significant moderating influence of package software 
sales (in proportion to total sales), Package Sales, on 
the effect of the interaction between RD and OutNet 
(see the three-way interaction RD X Package Sales X 
OutNet) on firm profits provides further empirical 
evidence for theoretical arguments supporting H2. 
Table A6 presents the results of using the following 
alternative R&D measures: log(R&D investments) as 
the logarithm of annual R&D investments in Model 1 
and Model 2, and R&D intensity, measured as the ratio 
of annual R&D investments over revenue, in Model 3 
and Model 4. The results of using these alternative 
measures, presented in Table A6, are, by and large, 
supportive of the main results.  
Table 6 presents the results of using the number of 
firms’ software patents as an alternative dependent 
variable that captures firms’ innovation output. 
Showing the effect of alliances on firms’ innovative 
output provides further empirical evidence supporting 
our theoretical arguments.  
Finally, Table 7 includes a number of important 
network structure and alliance characteristics measures 
to ensure the robustness of our results to such time-
variant factors. In Table 7, Model 1 and Model 2 
include control variables for network diversity, 
betweenness centrality, degree centrality, and access 
to structural holes. In addition, Model 1 in this table 
controls for the ratio of joint ventures and R&D 
agreements to total alliances, as well as the measure of 
tie multiplicity, calculated as the total number of 
alliance activities that a firm reports for its alliances 
over the total number of alliances that a firm has, as in 
Lavie (2007). The stability of the hypothesized 
relationships across Tables 5, 6, and 7 provides a 
further robustness check for our main results. 
4.2 Complementarities Between 
Alliances with Other IT-Producing 
Firms and R&D Investments 
The results in Table 3 show a positive and significant 
interaction between alliances with other IT-producing 
firms and R&D investments, RD X InNet. Alliances 
with other IT-producing firms can enable IT-producing 
firms to generate greater value from their R&D 
investments and pursue an R&D program that keeps 
pace with peers. As the relational view suggests, 
alliance network positioning is an inimitable firm 
resource that helps firms maintain a competitive 
advantage (Gulati et al. 2000). Powell et al. (1996, p. 
119-120) argue that innovation arises from learning 
networks of firms, rather than from individual firms; as 
a consequence, “firms must learn how to transfer 
knowledge across alliances and locate themselves in 
those network positions that enable them to keep pace 
with the most promising scientific or technological 
developments.”  
We further compare the moderating effect of alliances 
with other IT-producing firms (InNet) and R&D in the 
two samples of software consulting-services and 
package-product firms. The results, presented in Table 
4, show a higher coefficient estimate for package-
product firms compared to the coefficient estimate for 
consulting-services firms (seen by comparing the 
coefficients of the interaction term InNet X RD 
between Model 2 and Model 3), which is in the 
opposite direction of H2. Potential IT-producing 
partners will have strong technical capabilities; thus, 
while they may be complementary in some ways, these 
partners also will directly compete with the focal IT-
producing firm, thereby creating a source of risk of 
partnering with such firms. Prior studies have viewed 
alliance networks as structural conduits through which 
firms gain access to flows of knowledge and 
information. Knowledge-spillovers occur through both 
formal and informal channels (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004). Since IT-producing industries involve highly 
fungible IP that has diverse applications, a positioning 
strategy may have specific consequences for 
knowledge creation and value appropriation (Lavie, 
2007; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). As discussed earlier, 
knowledge in consulting-services firms is perceived to 
have higher levels of fungibility, and the higher 
coefficient estimate for software package-product 
firms might be attributed to the ability of the latter 
firms to better protect their IP. 
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Table 5: Using Alternative Measures for Consulting-Services and Package-Product Firms 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) 
FE: profits FE: profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet) 111.2*** 217.1*** 
 (26.36) (29.94) 
H2: RD X Consultancy Sales X Alliances with IT-consuming firms 
(OutNet) 
70.39*  
 (38.07)  
H2: RD X Package Sales X Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet)  -135.6*** 
  (30.88) 
RD X Consultancy Sales -84.14  
 (63.82)  
OutNet X Consultancy Sales -21.09  
 (92.65)  
RD X Patent 41.70*** 53.43*** 
 (11.91) (11.58) 
RD X Package Sales  50.65 
  (64.46) 
OutNet X Package Sales  59.45 
  (87.26) 
Package Sales  176.3 
  (185.5) 
Consultancy Sales -25.53  
 (196.9)  
OutNet 99.59 75.99 
 (70.11) (80.93) 
RD 61.86 24.53 
 (53.38) (64.68) 
Observations 1,267 1,267 
R-squared 0.620 0.629 
Number of unique firms 448 448 
F stat 35.46*** 36.80*** 
Note: Fixed-effect panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. All 
models include every control variable, removed from the table in the interest of space.  
 
Table 6: Software Patents as Dependent Variable 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
Same year 
software patents 
1 yr. future 
software patents 
2 yr. future 
software patents 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet) 6.399*** 8.660*** 10.74*** 
 (2.292) (2.323) (3.225) 
H2: RD X Consultancy (Consult) X Alliances with IT-
consuming firms (OutNet) 
20.49*** 15.85*** 19.69*** 
(2.701) (2.717) (3.505) 
RD -4.175 -1.071 1.732 
 (5.219) (5.264) (6.940) 
Consult -0.0831 16.20 46.15 
 (61.93) (59.02) (85.37) 
RD X Consult 1.505 -1.186 -6.127 
 (7.410) (7.495) (10.76) 
OutNet  20.99*** 15.49** 17.47** 
 (5.981) (6.264) (8.026) 
Consult X OutNet -3.626 2.042 -0.287 
 (7.654) (7.745) (9.905) 
Observations 1,279 1,109 926 
R-squared 0.669 0.706 0.638 
Number of unique firms 450 398 341 
F stat 44.51*** 46.47*** 28.61*** 
Note: Fixed-effect panel regression. Dependent variable is software patents instead of annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. All 
models include every control variable, removed from the table in the interest of space. 
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Table 7: Controlling for Alliance Network Measures and Alliance-Related Factors 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
FE: profits FE: profits FE: profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming 
firms (OutNet) 
75.69** 78.56** 94.36*** 
(32.63) (32.66) (25.83) 
H2: RD X Consultancy (Consult) X 







RD X Indirect Links to IT-producers 
(IndirectNet) 
145.8*** 146.4*** 134.6*** 
(26.85) (26.93) (21.41) 
RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) -39.48 -35.92 -30.45 
 (26.79) (26.84) (20.39) 
Patent X OutNet -193.2*** -191.1*** -187.8*** 
 (26.54) (26.51) (22.39) 
Patent X InNet -88.86*** -93.25*** -85.94*** 
 (24.33) (24.31) (20.43) 
Patent X IndirectNet 97.31*** 95.04*** 87.80*** 
 (25.51) (25.56) (21.20) 
RD -9.739 -1.740 1.816 
 (73.02) (73.12) (58.94) 
Consult -176.8 -66.10 -146.9 
 (828.3) (829.9) (697.5) 
RD X Consult 109.4 118.5 121.7 
 (106.4) (105.9) (84.46) 
OutNet 170.5* 156.6* 120.9* 
 (88.56) (88.70) (67.46) 
Consult X OutNet -36.71 -43.83 -4.764 
 (110.9) (110.7) (86.23) 
Network Diversity 54.33 -32.40  
 (117.1) (107.2)  
log(Network Constraint) -70.73 -0.735  
 (88.66) (83.67)  
log(Betweenness Centrality) -1.840 -0.492  
 (11.54) (11.53)  
Joint Ventures / Total Alliances -340.4   
 (261.0)   
R&D Alliances / Total Alliances -290.4   
 (190.9)   
Tie Multiplicity 159.6**   
 (80.38)   
Constant 1,413* 1,376* 832.2 
 (783.5) (771.8) (559.1) 
Observations 999 999 1,272 
R-squared 0.643 0.639 0.626 
Number of unique firms 350 350 449 
F stat 26.08 27.70 36.62 
Note: Fixed-effect panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression, with standard errors in parentheses. 
The model includes indicator variables for each year, as well as firm-level fixed effects. The research and development (RD) 
variable is the logarithm of R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. All models include all of the control 
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4.3 Econometric Considerations and 
Robustness Tests 
We consider here several econometric issues and how 
we address them: reverse causality, unobserved 
heterogeneity, sample selection, and multicollinearity.  
4.3.1 Reverse Causality 
To rule out reverse causality, we consider whether 
profits jointly drive alliances and R&D—and, more 
specifically, whether the joint effects are a result of 
reverse causality among individual variables in the 
model. Firms might adjust their R&D and alliance 
practices in response to windfalls in operating profits, 
and this would create a spurious interaction effect. 
Thus, we consider whether lag effects are present in the 
direction of causality suggested by the model, wherein 
joint interaction effects are present not just for the 
current year but also for the subsequent year. Table A2 
in the Appendix shows the difference in results when 
we consider the dependent variable as operating profits 
not just for the current year but also for three and four 
years in the past and up to three years into the future. 
We observe the separation in the sign and magnitude 
of main coefficient estimates to provide some insight 
into the direction of causality among the variables of 
interest. In particular, we see that the interaction 
between R&D investment and alliance types OutNet 
and InNet have no significant relationship with past 
values of operating profits, but they do have a positive 
and significant association with the same year profits 
as well as with profits in the third and fourth year into 
the future. Overall, our supplementary regressions do 
not suggest that firms attract more alliances as a result 
of more profits or more R&D.  
Further, we examine whether profits and R&D might 
influence alliancing activity, reporting the results in 
Table A3 of the Appendix. Addressing this concern is 
important because firms with high levels of R&D or 
profitability might attract more alliances. Thus, if 
reverse causality were a problem, we would detect a 
reverse effect in which alliance activity exhibits a 
positive sensitivity to firm-specific shocks in R&D or 
profits. In Table A3, we see that one-year lags of R&D 
(1 yr. past RD) have no effect on IndirectNet, with a 
statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.0987 in 
Model 1, or on InNet, with a statistically insignificant 
coefficient of -0.0901 in Model 3. We also see in 
Model 2 that after a year, one-year lags of R&D (1 yr. 
past RD) are associated instead with lower levels of 
OutNet. Coefficient effects of profits (1 yr. past 
Profits) on future IndirectNet in Model 1 and Model 7, 
as well as on future OutNet in Model 2 and Model 8, 
are statistically insignificant. Table A3 also shows a 
negative association between profits (1 yr. past Profits) 
and InNet after three years in Model 9. If reverse 
causality were present, it would make our coefficient 
estimates more conservative. Overall, we do not see 
lagged effects of three years in the relationship 
between profits and alliance activity that are positive; 
rather, some effects are actually negative, which 
further alleviates concerns about reverse causality as 
an underlying driver of our hypothesis tests.  
4.3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Even in the absence of reverse causality, unobserved 
variables might still bias the coefficient estimates. To 
some extent, the results in Tables A2 and A3 also 
reduce concerns about the simultaneous effects of 
potentially missing variables because most sources of 
reverse causality stem from unobserved factors that 
jointly influence the variables of interest. To address 
this further, we exploit the fact that a large set of 
unobserved factors tend not to change over short time 
periods: for instance, corporate culture (i.e., the 
external orientation of the firm culture which could 
lead to a tendency to form alliances), leadership 
strategy, R&D culture, and organizational structure. 
Although these relatively innate firm features 
sometimes change over long periods of time, they tend 
not to change very quickly. Firm-fixed effects over a 
relatively short panel already control for such factors 
by design, and these are already incorporated in our 
main empirical models. Therefore, it is useful to 
compare our empirical models with and without fixed 
effects to assess the sensitivity of the model estimates 
to such time-invariant firm characteristics. If ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and fixed-effect (FE) panel model 
estimates are similar, this would suggest that 
unobserved firm-specific factors are not systematically 
related to our main variables of interest. Arguably, if 
our model variables are generally uncorrelated with the 
comprehensive set of time-invariant firm 
characteristics (i.e., firm-fixed effects), this would 
suggest that the model variables are also unrelated to 
other unobserved characteristics that might change 
more frequently in time. Including fixed effects for 
each year, as well as market share, physical capital, 
industry competitiveness, and alliance partner R&D 
investments, reduces the likelihood that residual time-
varying unobservables might bias our model estimates. 
We report OLS results in Table A4, and they suggest 
that our results are, by and large, insensitive to firm-
fixed effects. 
In order to further explore the potential of unobserved 
heterogeneity, we test Arellano-Bond (AB) and 
random-effect models and report the results in Table 
A4 alongside OLS and FE results. In the AB model, 
we have included two lags of the dependent variables 
and instrumented our main interaction terms and the 
direct effects of variables in them using one lag. The 
Hausman test statistic to compare the results of AB, 
RE, and OLS models with the FE models was 
significant, a finding that can be attributed to different 
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assumptions in these models. The hypothesized 
relationship, however, has been largely stable in the 
models. Since FE models are known to have lower bias 
and greater stability in the presence of firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity, we rely upon the FE model 
for tests of our main hypotheses. Yet, the consistency 
of the results under vastly different model assumptions 
suggests that our results are robust to unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
In Table A7, we show the result of using Garen’s 
correction technique, as well as an extension of 
Garen’s model that has been used in prior research 
(Luan & Sudhir, 2010). We separately regress OutNet, 
IndirectNet, and R&D stock on factors likely to impact 
them. For OutNet and IndirectNet, we use partners’ IT 
investments, and for R&D stock, we use industry R&D 
intensity as an exclusion restriction to help with model 
identification. We store the residuals and include them, 
as well as their interaction with potentially endogenous 
variables, in the main model. The hypothesis test 
results (coefficient estimates of the interaction terms 
RD X OutNet and RD X Consult X OutNet in Table 7) 
remain robust under this correction technique.  
4.3.3 Sample Selection 
Our unpaired t-tests (with unequal variances) suggest 
that compared with the broader population of publicly 
listed US firms, firms in our final sample have slightly 
lower R&D investment, less physical capital, lower 
market value, higher sales, higher ROA, higher market 
size, higher operating income, and higher competition. 
Generally, this means that our findings may not extend 
as well to very small or unprofitable firms or to those 
in less competitive industries. A second potential 
concern is that the sample selection could skew the 
hypothesis test results under certain conditions, such as 
if idiosyncratic factors determining sample selection 
were systematically related to the main variables in the 
study. To alleviate these concerns, we make use of the 
unbalanced nature of the panel and exploit the fact that 
sample selection in a fixed-effect context is only a 
problem when it is related to time-varying 
idiosyncratic errors; hence, “any test for selection bias 
should test only this assumption” (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p. 581). We conduct the Nijman-Verbeek test adapted 
to the fixed-effect panel context and test for the 
significance of the lagged and forward selection 
indicators in our main models (Wooldridge, 2002). 
These selection indicators are statistically insignificant 
in our models, suggesting that there is no selection bias 
because of idiosyncratic errors. In summary, our 
statistical tests show no evidence of a selection 
mechanism that would positively bias our hypothesis 
test results; rather, our results appear to become more 
conservative when sample selection is accounted for.  
In Table A8, we present a test of our hypotheses for the 
time period of 1991 to 2016. The time frame of our 
original model, presented in Table 3, is limited by the 
lack of available patent data for the years after 2009. In 
the models that we present in Table A8, we have 
excluded the patent-related variables to extend the time 
frame. Table A8 also presents the results of testing our 
hypothesized relationships on samples of software and 
hardware firms in Model 1, broader IT-producing 
industries in Model 2, and IT-consuming industries in 
Model 3. Model 1 in this table shows consistent 
estimations for both hypotheses (H1 and H2), 
addressing concerns regarding potential biases 
introduced by our sample choice. Model 2, testing our 
main model on a sample of broader IT-producing 
industries, shows consistency in the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient estimates of our 
hypothesized relationship. In addition, Model 3, 
presenting the results of testing our model on a sample 
of non-IT-producing firms, reveals a negative 
coefficient estimate for the interaction term of RD X 
OutNet, which is in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized relationship. Comparing Model 1 and 
Model 2 with Model 3 shows that the hypothesized 
relationships are unique to IT-producing industries.  
4.3.4 Multicollinearity 
Our results do not suffer from multicollinearity 
because the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) in our 
main regression model is approximately four, which is 
well below the recommended threshold. As shown in 
Table A5, we estimated different versions of the main 
model with different subsets of variables in 
hierarchical style. The signs and magnitudes for the 
main variables of interest are quite stable as different 
subsets of control variables are included in the model 
specification. Overall, we do not find that the 
coefficient estimates suffer from instability caused by 
severe collinearity among the variables. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Main Findings  
Our goal in this study is to examine whether 
positioning in an alliance network affects the value 
firms appropriate from investments in R&D in an 
industry setting characterized by the high fungibility of 
knowledge. We begin with the premise that alliances 
provide opportunities to generate new value, 
enhancing the value of R&D investments. We test that 
premise and then further explore the alliance features 
that help protect R&D investments from appropriation 
by opportunistic partners, building on the relational 
perspective of the firm.  
Our findings suggest that central positioning in an 
alliance network in a complex industry ecosystem, 
such as in the interface between IT-producing and IT-
consuming firms, has positive implications for 
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profitability and returns to R&D investments. In the 
absence of strong formal mechanisms to protect IP, we 
argue that firms rely on informal barriers to serve as 
the underlying drivers of relational rents, as discussed 
by Dyer and Singh (1998). These drivers may include 
human co-specialization, process specificity, informal 
governance, and formation of trust in collaborative 
alliance activities. We propose and test direct 
implications of this theory: Alliances with IT-
consuming firms have a more beneficial effect on 
R&D returns for software consulting-services firms 
than for software package-product firms. 
In particular, our findings suggest that IT-producing 
firms’ returns to R&D investments increase with 
alliance ties to IT-consuming firms. Our models rule 
out a number of alternative explanations. In addition, 
we control for indirect ties of IT-producing firms to 
other IT producers (their potential rivals) by way of 
alliances with IT-consuming firms; the results hold 
after controlling for firm-fixed effects, which account 
for many unobserved characteristics that can be 
reasonably assumed as stable or constant over multiple 
years, such as organizational culture, subindustry 
(microchips vs. software), and many relatively stable 
organizational capabilities.  
5.2 Research Implications 
Our findings underscore the importance of positioning 
within the alliance networks of IT consumers and have 
major implications for at least two streams of IS 
research. First, our results contribute to the literature 
on the co-creation of digital innovations (Han et al., 
2012) in two ways. The extant literature considers 
alliances between IT-producing firms (Han et al., 
2012; Sarker et al., 2012), and our study extends this 
literature by exploring alliances between IT-producing 
firms and IT-consuming firms. While the existing 
literature on this topic explores the co-creation of value 
between IT-producing firms, our paper posits a similar 
phenomenon in the partnerships between IT-producing 
and IT-consuming firms. Our findings underscore that 
alliances with IT-consuming firms, similar to those 
with other IT-producing firms, provide both formal 
and informal channels through which firms gain access 
to information and knowledge (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004).  
In addition, we extend the existing literature by 
adopting a relational view of the firm and distinguish 
two broad groups of IT-producing firms based on the 
extent to which their resources and capabilities might 
be considered relation-specific: software consulting-
services versus software package-product firms. IT-
producing firms benefit more from alliances with IT-
consuming firms when firms develop industry-specific 
and firm-specific expertise that address the 
idiosyncratic needs of their alliance partners, which is 
generally the business model for software consulting-
services firms. From a research perspective, our 
findings suggest the need to consider how the 
idiosyncratic requirements of IT-consuming partners 
serve to protect and sustain the value of R&D 
investments and how these considerations may be 
different for different types of IT-producing firms that 
seek partnerships with IT-consuming firms.  
Second, our results contribute to the IS innovation 
literature (Kleis et al., 2012) in two ways. In line with 
the digital innovation literature on the distributed 
nature of digital innovations (Yoo et al., 2010), we 
posit an interaction effect between IT-producing firms’ 
partnerships with their corporate customers and their 
R&D investments. By showing that IT-producing 
firms may benefit from alliances with IT-consuming 
firms to derive greater profits from their R&D 
investments, our results expand research focused on 
the complementarities between returns on R&D and 
other strategic investments and resource-based factors 
(Havakhor et al., 2019; Ravichandran et al., 2017; 
Steelman et al., 2019). Ultimately, we posit a novel 
relation-based factor to add to existing resource-based 
factors (Havakhor et al., 2019).  
In addition, the costs and risks to IT-producing firms 
associated with collaborating with IT-consuming firms 
may be worth considering. Our findings suggest that 
the relational mechanism is effective in allowing firms 
to enhance their R&D output and safeguard their R&D 
returns by co-developing innovative resources and 
capabilities with IT-consuming firms. Alliances with 
customers and suppliers can help generate knowledge 
that can enhance innovation. For IT-producing firms, 
the value of these alliances overall seems to outweigh 
their potential hazards. In the IT industry context in 
which intellectual capital is highly fungible, our 
empirical results suggest that such risks do not negate 
the benefits of collaborating closely with alliance 
partners from other industries. This is a surprising and 
significant finding, considering the extent to which 
prior work has served to caution firms against such 
appropriation risks (Lavie, 2007).  
By using the relational view of the firm, we create a 
theoretical link between two streams of IS literature, 
namely co-creation of IT business value (Han et al., 
2012) and digital innovation (Kleis et al., 2012; Yoo et 
al., 2010). Accordingly, we extend our knowledge of 
relation-specific characteristics that contribute to the 
co-creation of digital innovations and provide an 
intradisciplinary contribution to the field of IS 
(Tarafdar & Davison, 2018).  
We also contribute to the extant literature on the 
performance of software alliances by investigating the 
fungibility of a firm’s resources in the context of its 
local network structure, rather than focusing on the 
firm’s choice of resource architecture. Our findings are 
supported by anecdotal evidence in the IT industry 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
403 
where alliances are the norm in many areas even as 
companies compete vigorously for the same customers 
or technologies. The business press suggests that 
superior returns on R&D for Apple may in part be 
because of the company’s ability to leverage the R&D 
efforts of its suppliers, the scale of business it provides 
to them, and the complementary investments that 
Apple makes in its marketing activities (Satariano, 
2015). Further research on how alliances help leverage 
value from other types of investments, such as those in 
marketing, may shed light on the relative importance 
of various types of information and knowledge 
supported by such partnerships.  
5.3 Managerial Implications 
Our findings provide potentially generalizable insights 
because software is not altogether different from the 
digital products and services developed in many 
industries—entertainment, news, and publishing, for 
instance. Most digital and intangible innovations tend 
to be fungible with many alternative applications, low 
marginal replication costs, and high initial 
development costs. This characteristic makes 
investment in digital innovations risky and sustaining 
value from innovation potentially hazardous in the 
context of alliance relationships. Our findings suggest 
that interfirm relationships, in particular the joint 
development of digital innovations with firms’ 
customers, can help firms sustain and generate value 
from their investments in R&D. In this way, our 
findings highlight the value of partnerships that entail 
collaboration with consumers. 
In line with the theoretical perspective of the relational 
view, managers should consider whether their 
counterparts in an alliance relationship are sufficiently 
invested by virtue of the relation-specificity of their 
investments and whether they will be perceived to be 
likewise invested by their alliance partners. Such 
noncontractible factors help enhance trust and 
commitment to generate and sustain R&D investment 
value through interfirm alliances (Mithas et al., 2008), 
especially when contracts are insufficient to manage 
the hazards of exposing valuable intellectual property. 
Such noncontractible investments are particularly 
important in the context of digital innovation, where 
initial development costs are high but replication costs 
are low, factors that make these investments vulnerable 
to ex post opportunism. 
5.4 Limitations and Suggestions for 
Further Work 
This study has several limitations that can be addressed 
in future work. First, because of data limitations, we use 
industry-level approximations for the control variables 
of partner firms’ IT and R&D investments. Future 
studies might use firm-level measures of IT investments 
and IT applications to gain additional insights into the 
role of IT capabilities (Ravichandran et al., 2017; 
Saldanha et al., 2017; Saldanha et al., 2020).  
Second, this study does not examine factors that 
influence the R&D returns of IT-consuming firms; 
doing so in addition to studying the performance of 
their IT-producing partners will lead to more detailed 
conclusions regarding who benefits more from such 
cross-industry alliances. Finally, it would be useful to 
conduct similar studies in emerging economies and for 
alliances among IT-consuming firms to support further 
generalizability. Researchers can further explore how 
alliances help firms improve the pace and inimitability 
of their innovation efforts and the governance 
mechanisms that firms use to manage alliance partners.  
Future research might examine how the same 
theoretical mechanisms for leveraging and 
safeguarding innovation apply in other multifirm 
innovation contexts. For example, there has been a 
growing interest in the open innovation context, which 
sometimes involves networks of corporate alliances 
(Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Jarvenpaa, 2014). Many 
products and services developed in open innovation 
contexts are digital in form; hence, the same 
mechanisms for safeguarding and leveraging value in 
the face of acute transaction hazards can apply in open 
innovation settings, as well.  
To conclude, our analyses of a panel of 464 IT-
producing firms spanning the 14-year period from 
1996 to 2009 provide new insights regarding how such 
firms protect and leverage value from their R&D 
investments according to their positioning in networks 
of alliances with IT-consuming firms. Overall, our 
findings suggest that firms need to position themselves 
in alliance ecosystems to maximize their ability to 
generate innovations and derive value from them. We 
find evidence that IT-producing firms can enhance 
their returns to R&D by forming alliances with IT-
consuming firms. For IT-producing firms, returns to 
R&D increase with alliance ties to IT-consuming 
firms, and alliances with IT-consuming firms have a 
more beneficial effect on R&D returns for software 
consulting-services firms than for software package-
product firms. The relation-specific resources that are 
shared in alliances help consulting-services firms to 
limit appropriation hazards and safeguard their R&D 
because they gain unique domain knowledge while co-
creating value with their corporate partners. Together, 
these findings have implications for how firms should 
develop their strategic posture for alliances in terms of 
the types of partners and depth of collaborative 
activities they pursue. Such an ecosystem perspective 
is becoming more relevant as a theoretical lens, as 
technological innovations are increasingly 
interdependent across firm and industry boundaries 
and increasing digitization serves to make such 
innovations at once more dynamic and fungible. 
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and under higher market competition 
appropriate a larger share of the value 
generated through the alliance.  





Chi et al. (2010) Alliance network 




Network structures and IT capabilities 
enhance firms’ ability to reach and 
exploit network resources.  
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control (Kirsch, 
Sambamurthy et al., 
2002) 
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governance 
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No. Alliances from 
different industries 
but not focused on 
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Open innovation 
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Yes. Based on the 
nature of shared 
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Note: This table is not meant to show an exhaustive list of relevant studies. 
Table A2: Fixed-Effect Panel Regressions: Past and Future Profit 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L4. Profits L3. Profits Profits F1. Profits F2. Profits F3. Profits 














RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) -12.48 
(22.19) 
4.769 137.6*** 175.6*** 164.1*** 43.00 
(20.65) (19.81) (21.07) (28.81) (35.97) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-Producers 
(IndirectNet) 
2.511 10.27 -28.67 -65.33*** -68.49** -46.07 
(23.24) (21.07) (20.02) (20.56) (29.66) (33.93) 
Observations 631 767 1,311 1,141 950 770 
Number of Unique Firms 225 265 464 406 345 255 
F stat 26.70*** 32.04*** 38.59*** 36.63*** 16.26*** 16.01*** 
R-squared 0.688 0.686 0.625 0.640 0.484 0.506 
Note: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. L[N] represents N years in the past, and F[N] represents N years in the future for the dependent 
variable firm profits. All models include indicator variables for each year, in addition to firm-fixed effects. Also included in these models are all the control variables from the Table 3 models (not shown 
for brevity). The research and development (RD) variable is the logarithm of R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. 
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Table A3: Reverse Causality Tests: Fixed-Effect Panel Regressions 







1 yr. future 
IndirectNet 
1 yr. future 
OutNet 
1 yr. future 
InNet 
2 yrs. future 
IndirectNet 
2 yrs. future 
OutNet 
2 yrs. future 
InNet 
          
1 Yr. Past Profits 1.99e-05 1.32e-05 -1.60e-05    0.000159 -0.000243 -0.000782** 
 (4.47e-05) (3.30e-05) (2.98e-05)    (0.000485) (0.000358) (0.000321) 
1 Yr. Past RD -0.0987 -0.179* -0.0901    -0.101 -0.176* -0.0787 
 (0.126) (0.0933) (0.0843)    (0.127) (0.0935) (0.0839) 
1 Yr. Past ITPartnerInd -0.00381* -0.00104 0.00280**    -0.00379* -0.00108 0.00270** 
 (0.00196) (0.00145) (0.00131)    (0.00196) (0.00145) (0.00130) 
1 Yr. Past RDPartnerInd -0.00560 0.0349* 0.0226    -0.00527 0.0343* 0.0208 
 (0.0270) (0.0200) (0.0180)    (0.0271) (0.0200) (0.0179) 
1 Yr. Past log(Capital) 0.280** 0.230** -0.0631    0.279** 0.232** -0.0573 
 (0.130) (0.0963) (0.0870)    (0.131) (0.0964) (0.0865) 
1 Yr. Past 
log(MarketShare) 
6.99e-05 -0.0729 0.185*  0.0707  -0.00768 -0.0586 0.227** 
(0.156) (0.115) (0.104)  (0.155)  (0.159) (0.117) (0.105) 
1 Yr. Past HHI -5.892 -7.654*** 2.285 -3.543 -10.82** 5.227 -5.917 -7.607** 2.425 
 (3.980) (2.939) (2.655) (5.255) (4.270) (3.633) (3.986) (2.942) (2.639) 
2 Yrs. Past Profits    1.68e-05 -1.03e-05 -4.61e-05    
    (5.58e-05) (4.58e-05) (3.86e-05)    
2 Yrs. Past log(RD)    -0.240 -0.252** -0.161    
    (0.148) (0.114) (0.102)    
1 Yr. Past ITPartnerInd    -0.00219 -0.000613 0.00419***    
    (0.00227) (0.00186) (0.00157)    
 
1 Yr. Past RDPartnerInd    -0.0311 0.0195 0.0286    
    (0.0299) (0.0246) (0.0207)    
2 Yrs. Past log(Capital)    0.0215 0.0510 0.0785    
    (0.149) (0.114) (0.103)    
2 Yrs. Past 
log(Marketshare) 
   0.134  0.00128    
    (0.192)  (0.133)    
1 Yr. Past RD X Profit       -1.26e-05 2.32e-05 6.94e-05** 
       (4.38e-05) (3.23e-05) (2.90e-05) 
Constant -0.181 -0.700 1.461 1.337 1.397 -0.168 -0.247 -0.580 1.820* 
 (1.383) (1.021) (0.923) (1.618) (1.271) (1.118) (1.403) (1.036) (0.929) 
Observations (Firms) 620 (237) 620 (237) 620 (237) 459 (169) 459 (169) 459 (169) 620 (237) 620 (237) 620 (237) 
R-squared 0.098 0.183 0.090 0.100 0.196 0.107 0.098 0.184 0.104 
F stat 2.085 4.292 1.893 1.674 3.694 1.812 1.980 4.098 2.109 
F test 0.00517 1.20e-08 0.0137 0.0437 1.31e-06 0.0238 0.00768 2.09e-08 0.00387 
Note: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. All models include indicator variables for each 
year (not shown for brevity). 
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Table A4: Comparison of Fixed Effects, OLS, Random Effects, and Arellano-Bond Tests of H1:         
Moderating Influence of Alliances on Effect of R&D on Firm Profits 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE: Profits AB: Profits OLS: Profits RE: Profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms 
(OutNet) 
131.5*** 74.34* 385.5*** 534.4*** 
(22.43) (41.53) (23.72) (128.5) 
RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) 140.5*** 87.17** 328.9*** 365.3*** 
 (19.99) (36.97) (21.19) (82.30) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-producers 
(IndirectNet) 
-31.41 -1.214 -149.3*** -284.8*** 
 (20.21) (34.17) (23.04) (86.86) 
Patent X OutNet -160.4*** -94.48*** -302.1*** -437.9*** 
 (21.12) (30.26) (24.76) (136.7) 
Patent X InNet -89.47*** 24.41 -144.2*** -116.3* 
 (19.59) (31.75) (23.45) (69.17) 
Patent X IndirectNet 87.44*** 40.26 138.8*** 221.5** 
 (20.91) (29.06) (25.86) (101.8) 
1st Lag Profit  0.421***   
  (0.0686)   
2nd Lag Profit  0.328***   
  (0.0826)   
1st Lag RD X OutNet   -44.71*   
  (24.87)   
1st Lag RD  93.16   
  (225.7)   
OutNet 69.37 -85.38 -230.4*** -388.3*** 
 (58.21) (126.4) (63.25) (138.9) 
1st OutNet  3.133   
  (85.76)   
RD X Patent 35.95*** -27.11 174.6*** 251.3*** 
 (10.83) (21.57) (10.61) (52.00) 
IndirectNet -20.81 -38.18 41.69 93.17 
 (34.93) (73.56) (38.71) (66.42) 
InNet 24.06 -164.7* -190.5*** -288.9*** 
 (44.53) (98.66) (48.98) (99.90) 
RD 28.36 -100.9 185.9*** 117.0** 
 (49.51) (274.2) (28.27) (48.99) 
Patent -173.1*** 18.71 -434.8*** -608.2*** 
 (42.72) (97.68) (41.37) (136.4) 
ITPartnerIndus -0.116 1.803 0.138 0.515 
 (1.012) (2.008) (1.197) (1.158) 
log(Capital) 53.01 76.97 127.6*** 104.8* 
 (51.37) (164.7) (38.21) (57.80) 
log(Marketshare) 61.26 46.66 16.68 37.62 
 (57.51) (220.6) (30.93) (38.37) 
HHI -230.1 -4,452 -108.2 -214.3 
 (1,552) (5,633) (1,099) (1,514) 
RDPartnerIndus 8.765 -24.74 6.281 7.505 
 (9.631) (19.65) (7.627) (9.296) 
Collab -33.33*** 14.59* -11.43* 14.01 
 (4.640) (7.464) (6.065) (18.06) 
Arm’s-Length -99.08*** -34.98 -19.78* 15.70 
 (8.656) (22.12) (10.18) (28.65) 
Observations 1,311 283 1,311 1,311 
R-squared 0.615   0.801 
Number of unique firms 464 100 464  
F stat 40.73***    
Chi sqr  1177   
Note: Fixed-effects, random-effects, and Arellano-Bond panel regressions and ordinary least-squares model regression. Dependent 
variable is annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. The models include indicator variables 
for each year, as well as firm-level or industry-level fixed effects. The research and development (RD) variable is the logarithm of R&D 
stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Logarithm values of InNet, OutNet, and IndirectNet are also used.  
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Table A5: Hierarchical Models for Robustness: Fixed-Effect Panel Regressions 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE: Profits FE: Profits FE: Profits FE: Profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-
consuming firms (OutNet) 
90.44*** 135.0*** 81.93***  
(25.32) (22.41) (25.70)  
H2: RD X Consultancy (Consult) X 
Alliances with IT-consuming firms 
(OutNet) 
107.9***  69.23*  
(29.26)  (36.59)  
RD X Consult 128.5 119.2 -84.39 103.8 
 (79.88) (80.46) (84.14) (82.14) 
Consult X OutNet -26.30 153.4** 188.0 131.0* 
 (83.41) (68.22) (118.9) (69.58) 
RD X Alliances with IT-producers 
(InNet) 
137.6*** 140.1***  178.2*** 
 (19.81) (19.96)  (19.33) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-
producers (IndirectNet) 
-28.67 -31.48  48.31*** 
 (20.02) (20.16)  (15.53) 
Patent X OutNet -182.2*** -165.1***  -86.67*** 
 (21.55) (21.21)  (17.11) 
Patent X InNet -88.48*** -87.49***  -117.8*** 
 (19.43) (19.58)  (19.33) 
Patent X IndirectNet 85.46*** 85.58***  39.42** 
 (20.70) (20.86)  (19.82) 
Consult -154.1 -132.4 410.2 -135.3 
 (664.4) (669.5) (956.7) (683.9) 
RD X Patent 53.44*** 38.66***  16.38 
 (11.52) (10.88)  (10.45) 
OutNet 124.8* 29.94 -223.8*** 210.4*** 
 (65.93) (61.18) (65.73) (54.48) 
IndirectNet -23.22 -17.58  -83.01** 
 (34.60) (34.84)  (33.81) 
InNet 23.43 17.13  15.62 
 (44.08) (44.38)  (45.33) 
RD -3.373 -11.33 94.67 -12.35 
 (56.83) (57.23) (66.83) (58.45) 
Patent -196.3*** -176.4***  -135.2*** 
 (42.64) (42.62)  (42.97) 
ITPartnerIndus -0.249 0.0571  -0.493 
 (1.000) (1.004)  (1.021) 
log(Capital) 50.33 51.41  52.88 
 (50.84) (51.23)  (52.33) 
log(Marketshare) 63.70 71.62  54.98 
 (57.11) (57.51)  (58.67) 
HHI 2,613 2,126  1,443 
 (2,155) (2,167)  (2,211) 
Collab -29.04*** -32.81***  -33.82*** 
 (4.712) (4.636)  (4.732) 
Arm’s-Length -105.1*** -98.05***  -111.2*** 
 (8.803) (8.656)  (8.557) 
Constant 875.3 914.6* -19.31 906.2 
 (548.4) (552.6) (297.7) (564.4) 
     
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,315 1,311 
Number of Unique Firms 464 464 467 464 
F stat 38.59*** 38.72*** 8.028*** 37.19*** 
R-squared 0.625 0.618 0.162 0.601 
Note: Fixed-effects panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits.  
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include indicator variables for each 
year. Model 1 reports our main results. Model 2 reports the test of only H2. Model 3 tests H1 and H2 when not including any control variables. 
Model 4 reports the results of including only the control variables in Model 1. Comparing Model 1 and Model 4 shows that both the R-squared 
and the F statistic increase when adding the hypothesized relationships to the models. 
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Table A6: Alternative R&D and Dependent Measures 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q Profits Profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms 
(OutNet) 
0.639 1.611** 47.58* 100.1*** 
(0.784) (0.647) (27.83) (23.58) 
H2: RD X Consultancy (Consult) X Alliances with 
IT-consuming firms (OutNet) 
1.752**  114.0***  
(0.808)  (32.65)  
RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) -0.428 -0.660 114.8*** 121.7*** 
 (0.481) (0.472) (23.11) (23.19) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-producers (IndirectNet) -1.688*** -2.241*** -0.400 -9.353 
 (0.631) (0.581) (21.87) (21.88) 
RD X Consult 1.578 0.0656 51.99 53.20 
 (0.963) (0.667) (105.5) (106.3) 
Patent X OutNet 0.0256 0.0190 -146.5*** -137.7*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0242) (21.05) (21.05) 
Patent X InNet -0.0461* -0.0395 -51.66*** -59.78*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0259) (19.57) (19.58) 
Patent X IndirectNet -0.0299 -0.0322 69.81*** 75.71*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0262) (21.39) (21.48) 
Consult X OutNet -0.122 0.144 -330.2** 137.2* 
 (0.175) (0.126) (153.3) (75.26) 
RD -1.240* -0.658 9.054 11.04 
 (0.649) (0.595) (69.74) (70.25) 
Consult -0.0745 0.242 -310.4 -274.4 
 (0.775) (0.766) (802.5) (808.4) 
InNet 0.220* 0.248** -243.9*** -269.7*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (91.79) (92.17) 
IndirectNet 0.404*** 0.496*** -49.37 -19.78 
 (0.141) (0.136) (77.32) (77.43) 
OutNet -0.241 -0.391*** 59.66 -165.4 
 (0.159) (0.144) (124.3) (107.1) 
RD X Patent 0.0379* 0.0380*   
 (0.0194) (0.0196)   
Patent -0.204** -0.199** -43.76 -68.65** 
 (0.0809) (0.0814) (31.93) (31.35) 
Advertising Intensity 2.033 2.126   
 (1.653) (1.663)   
Employees 0.00877 0.00944   
 (0.00743) (0.00747)   
ITPartnerIndus 0.000540 0.000521 -0.00872 0.190 
 (0.00181) (0.00182) (1.100) (1.107) 
log(Capital) -0.0439 -0.0422 18.64 15.84 
 (0.115) (0.115) (62.70) (63.16) 
log(Marketshare) -0.181 -0.144 64.78 80.85 
 (0.154) (0.154) (66.09) (66.42) 
HHI 2.171 3.572 2,551 1,620 
 (3.565) (3.528) (2,418) (2,421) 
RDPartnerIndus -0.00403 -0.00580 2.474 5.254 
 (0.0171) (0.0172) (10.28) (10.32) 
Collab 0.00817 0.00632 -33.57*** -36.90*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00795) (4.965) (4.909) 
Arm’s-Length -0.0138 -0.0100 -122.5*** -116.1*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (9.104) (8.985) 
Observations 527 527 1,197 1,197 
R-squared 0.490 0.481 0.610 0.604 
Number of unique firms 206 206 412 412 
F stat 7.154*** 7.128*** 33.53*** 33.66*** 
Note: Fixed-effects panel regression. Dependent variables are Tobin’s q and annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression, with standard errors in parentheses. The models 
include indicator variables for each year, as well as firm-level fixed effects. The research and development (RD) variable in Model 1 and Model 2 
is the logarithm of annual R&D investments; in Model 3 and Model 4, RD is R&D intensity, defined as R&D/sales. In the Tobin’s q models, 
advertising intensity and the number of employees are used as control variables. Logarithm values of InNet, OutNet, and IndirectNet are also used.  
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Table A7: Using Garen’s Correction Technique to Test for Potential Endogeneity in the Main Variables 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
Profits Profits Profits 
H1: RD X Alliances with IT-consuming firms (OutNet) 85.08*** 83.47*** 92.63*** 
(26.00) (25.34) (26.02) 
H2: RD X Consultancu (Consult) X Alliances with IT-
consuming firms (OutNet) 
105.0*** 105.4*** 106.0*** 
(30.03) (29.97) (29.39) 
RD X Alliances with IT-producers (InNet) 135.9*** 135.0*** 138.2*** 
 (19.96) (19.94) (19.86) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-producers (IndirectNet) -25.06 -23.56 -30.33 
 (20.54) (19.98) (20.60) 
Patent X OutNet -170.7*** -171.5*** -181.4*** 
 (21.84) (21.69) (21.72) 
Patent X InNet -86.72*** -87.12*** -87.87*** 
 (20.10) (19.88) (19.69) 
Patent X IndirectNet 79.15*** 78.99*** 86.10*** 
 (20.76) (20.75) (20.73) 
RD -125.8 -141.7 -1.455 
 (779.7) (778.9) (56.94) 
Yc_RD 146.0 158.8  
 (785.4) (784.7)  
RD X Yc_RD 92.55*** 91.51***  
 (19.12) (19.09)  
OutNet 301.4* 116.8* 280.3* 
 (169.0) (66.46) (167.3) 
Yc_OutNet -175.8  -149.4 
 (157.0)  (154.8) 
OutNet X Yc_OutNet -15.03  -15.37 
 (39.58)  (39.70) 
RD X Consult 253.7*** 255.3*** 124.3 
 (90.23) (90.19) (80.03) 
Consult X OutNet -68.17 -68.55 -26.34 
 (85.29) (85.22) (83.52) 
RD X OutNet 49.22*** 48.56*** 54.04*** 
 (11.93) (11.81) (11.65) 
Consult -449.2 -511.1 -105.7 
 (672.0) (669.5) (667.6) 
Observations (unique firms) 1,269 (440) 1,269 (440) 1,311 (464) 
R-squared 0.637 0.636 0.625 
F stat 34.60 36.41 35.52 
Note: Fixed-effects panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression, with standard errors in parentheses. The models 
include indicator variables for each year, as well as firm-level fixed effects. The research and development (RD) variable is the logarithm of 
R&D stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Logarithm values of InNet, OutNet, and IndirectNet are also used. Yc_OutNet and 
Yc_RD are predicted residuals of regressing OutNet and R&D on industry average RD and advertising intensity, patents, physical capital, 
market share, HHI, Partners RD, InNet, and IndirectNet variables. All models also include the direct effects of IndirectNet, InNet, Patent, 
ITPartnerIndus, log(Capital), log(Marketshare), HHI, RDPartnerIndus, Collab, and Arm’s-Length (not shown for brevity). 
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Table A8: Testing H1 and H2 for the Time Period of 1991-2016  
and Comparing Results for IT-Producing and IT-Consuming Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 






H1: RD X Alliances with IT-
consuming firms (OutNet) 
96.94*** 117.2*** -58.33*** 
(16.13) (14.42) (18.74) 
H2: RD X Consultancy (Consult) 








RD X Alliances with IT-producers 
(InNet) 
-96.68*** -85.00*** 71.71 
(18.92) (17.37) (67.96) 
RD X Indirect Links to IT-
producers (IndirectNet) 
-57.79*** -61.31*** -111.1*** 
(9.810) (9.329) (21.73) 
RD 207.6*** 179.6*** 158.4*** 
 (31.49) (27.99) (41.47) 
OutNet -206.9*** -253.7*** 43.36 
 (69.68) (63.19) (85.07) 
RD X Consult -296.7*** -270.8***  
 (89.28) (88.86)  
OutNet X Consult -292.6 -259.2  
 (265.0) (264.3)  
IndirectNet 157.6*** 166.7*** 289.3** 
 (39.42) (37.69) (118.0) 
InNet 275.0*** 241.1*** 37.06 
 (91.37) (84.87) (445.8) 
Ind. Avg. Profitability 30.62 61.25** 173.8*** 
 (34.02) (30.46) (42.20) 
Collab -16.47*** -16.45*** 29.13** 
 (4.120) (3.843) (14.80) 
Arm’s-Length -60.39*** -57.37*** -2.119 
 (4.451) (4.243) (9.842) 
Diversification 70.14 41.76 -32.65 
 (89.53) (80.70) (133.6) 
HHI 315.9* 199.6 -157.8 
 (165.3) (148.4) (190.1) 
Weighted Market Share 4,994*** 3,982*** 932.2*** 
 (293.6) (261.4) (257.7) 
Constant -306.7 -268.2 -750.7** 
 (283.7) (254.9) (381.5) 
Observations 6,901 8,044 7,700 
Number of unique firms 1,513 1,770 1,586 
F stat 43.56*** 41.30*** 9.094*** 
R-squared 0.250 0.218 0.0552 
Note: Fixed-effects panel regression. Dependent variable is annual profits. 
*Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Fixed-effect panel regression, with standard errors in parentheses. The models 
include indicator variables for each year, as well as firm-level fixed effects. Model 1 includes firms in industries with NAICS codes 5112, 5145, 
518, and 334. Model 2 includes firms in industries with NAICS codes 511, 514, 517, 518, 519, 334, 335, and 423. Model 3 includes firms that 
are not in Model 2 industries. 
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